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One reason to call an activity a vice and suppress it is that it reduces a
person’s future happiness more than it increases his present happiness. Gru-
ber & Koszegi (2001) show how a vice tax can increase a person’s welfare
in a model of multiple selves with hyperbolic preferences across time. The
present paper shows that an interself analogy of the Kaldor-Hicks compen-
sation criterion can justify a vice ban whether preferences are hyperbolic or
exponential, but subject to the caveat that the person has a binding con-
straint on borrowing.
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A common justiﬁcation for laws to discourage vice is that although the
vice makes a person happy in the present, it will cause him even more un-
happiness in the future. Gruber & Koszegi (2001) formalize this argument in
the context of smoking and show how cigarette taxes can raise welfare. They
build a model of multiple selves linked across time by altruism and the addic-
tive consequences of smoking. They call these consequences “internalities”
between diﬀerent time-selves of the same person in analogy to “externalities”
between diﬀerent people. Their model assumes hyperbolic discounting and
as a welfare criterion they maximize the utility of the ﬁrst of the multiple
selves.
In this paper I will show that neither hyperbolic discounting nor that
particular welfare criterion is necessary for the idea of discouraging vice to
protect future selves to be valid. I will use a model of one person who is
divided into three selves across time. A key assumption will be that the
person cannot borrow against future income. Given that assumption, sup-
pression of the vice combined with a transfer from a future self to a present
self results in a Pareto improvement. If the transfer is not made, there is still
a Kaldor-Hicks improvement.
What is most important in Gruber & Koszegi (2001) is perhaps not the
hyperbolic discounting but the idea of multiple selves and the ineﬃciency that
can arise from internalities. If we are prepared to accept a multiple selves
model and the idea of basing a welfare function on it, then paternalism can
be desirable even if the person’s discounting is orthodoxly exponential.
The Kaldor-Hicks argument has important caveats, however, because
it depends on transfers that have their own internalities, those created by
intraself altruism. The present self cares about the future self’s consumption,
so a transfer of future wealth to the present is not an unmixed blessing for
him— he cares that his future self consumes less. Thus, we will have to
inquire as to whether the present, vice- tempted, self is is willing to accept a
compensating transfer that will increase present consumption at the expense
of future consumption.
I will start by laying out the three-period model used throughout the
paper, and then explore diﬀerent variants of the model. First we will assume
2that utility is linear in consumption so as to lay out starkly the conditions
under which the intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion recommends regulation of
smoking. We will use situations with constrained borrowing, unconstrained
borrowing, and saving to show how the laissez faire transfers of consumption
across time periods aﬀect the Kaldor-Hicks transfers related to smoking.
Then we will let utility be concave in consumption so that the person will
wish to smooth consumption over time and show the eﬀect of borrowing
constraints in that context.
2. The Model
A person lives for three periods labelled 0, 1, and 2. He receives the
same income, W, in each period. We will denote his consumption of the
single good by C0, C1, and C2. Our person can save at interest rate r, but he
cannot borrow. We will denote wealth in each period as W0, W1, W2, where
W0 = W and the later wealths depend on earlier saving.
In period 1, the person chooses between smoking (X = 1) or not smoking
(X = 0). We will assume the monetary cost of smoking is negligible, so it
does not reduce consumption.1 If the person chooses to smoke he receives
1 unit of utility in period 1 and loses α in period 2, where we assume that
α > 1 so the loss is bigger than the gain.
Total utility is given by the following function of the three consumption
choices and the smoking choice:
U0 = U(C0) + βδ(X + U(C1)) + βδ
2(−αX + U(C2)), (1)
with 0 ≤ β < 1 and




The “consume-early” assumption, inequality (2), says that the person’s rate
of time preference is greater than the interest rate.
We will assume for the ﬁrst part of the paper that utility is linear in con-
sumption (U(C) = C). Later, relaxing this assumption and the assumption
1The reader dissatisﬁed with smoking having no eﬀect on consumption may replace
smoking with a diﬀerent vice, e. g. self-drawn tattoos or unhealthy sexual practices.
3of equal incomes will introduce the complication of “bequests” motivated by
consumption smoothing.
Utility function (1) includes both the case of conventional exponential
discounting and the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting in the style of Laib-
son (1997). Our person has an exponential discount factor of 0 ≤ δ < 1
1+r
(so his rate of time preference is greater than the market interest rate) and
a hyperbolic adjustment parameter of β, where 0 ≤ β < 1. If β = 0 or δ = 0
he does not care at all about the welfare of his future self; if β = 1 he has a
standard exponential-discounting utility function.2
A value of β between 0 and 1 leads to the standard features of hyperbolic
discounting: besides preferring earlier consumption to later, the person puts
a special value on consumption immediately instead of later. As a result, in
period 0 his tradeoﬀ between consumption in periods 1 and 2, both distant,
is diﬀerent from the tradeoﬀ he would make in period 1, when period-1
consumption is immediate. This introduces a time inconsistency absent when
β = 1 and discounting is purely exponential.
We will view this person as consisting of three selves, Self 0, Self 1, and
Self 2. Self 0’s utility function, deﬁned over the present and future decisions
viewed from Period 0, is equation (1). Self 1 and Self 2 have the utility
functions:
U1 = X + U(C1) + βδ(−αX + U(C2)), (3)
and
U2 = −αX + U(C2). (4)
The model sets up as simply as possible three periods when smoking
has no immediate eﬀect on utility (period 0), has a positive eﬀect (period 1),
and has a negative eﬀect (period 2). As far as smoking goes, Self 0 is close
to what some would call “the long-run consumer” who has preferences but
does not choose the action, but Self 0 does choose his own consumption.
2Phelps & Pollack (1968) had used the quasi-hyperbolic form to discount generations
of people over time. Laibson (1997) applied it to within the self and named it “quasi-
hyperbolic”. True “hyperbolic” discounting, proposed by Chung & Herrnstein (1961) in
connection with a particular theory of behavior, has similar qualitative features but is
more complicated to work with. See Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman & Weinberg
(2001) for an explanation of the diﬀerences.
4Self 0 cares about Self 1 only through actions that occur in Self 1’s
period, and about Self 2 only through actions that occur in Self 2’s period.
Self 0 does not care that Self 1 derives utility from Self 2’s consumption. If
he did, Self 2’s consumption would count double in Self 0’s utility function.
That is plausible if Self 0’s utility arises from thinking of how happy he will
feel in the future instead of from thinking of how happy particular actions
will be making him in the future. Caplin & Leahy (2004) cite Loewenstein
(1992) as saying this is the Jevons approach to utility. Here, we are instead
using what he calls the Samuelson approach. I take the Samuelson approach
as better reﬂecting the idea that each self is like a person deciding on his
future actions, and because the Jevons approach makes most sense when
memory as well as anticipation aﬀect utility (as Caplin & Leahy [2004] do
assume).
Memory yields no utility in our utility function here. In period 1 the
person derives no pleasure from remembering his consumption in period 0.
For our purpose of looking at the amoking decision, including memory would
make little diﬀerence, so long as we assume that memory yields less utility
than the event remembered, though it would add many extra terms to the
equations. It would make smoking somewhat more attractive, since in Period
2 the person would derive utility from Period 1’s pleasure from smoking.
The Equilibrium Choices under Laissez Faire
Self 0 controls the value of C0, Self 1 controls X and C1, and Self 2
controls C2. This distribution of power, not the equal incomes across time,
is the true distribution of property rights.
Let us work back from the end. Self 2 would consume his entire wealth,
so C2 = W + (1 + r)(W1 − C1). If he could choose variables from earlier
periods, he would choose X = 0, C0 = 0, and C1 = 0: a ban on smoking, and
zero consumption in the earlier periods so he would have more consumption
himself.
Self 1 would maximize (3) by choice of X and C1 subject to the constraint
that C2 = W +(1+r)(W1−C1). Under our assumption that utility is linear
he would have a corner solution and consume his entire wealth: C1 = W1. He
derives utility from Self 2’s consumption, but it is discounted by βδ, which
is less than 1/(1 + r) by the consume-early assumption. He would choose





If he could control C0 and C2, Self 1 would choose C0 = 0 to increase
his own consumption, and he would choose C2 = W2.
Self 0, like Self 1, is subject to the consume-early assumption and so will
choose C0 = W.
If Self 0 could control C1 he would set C1 = W, just as Self 1 would,
because of the consume-early assumption. He would choose X = 1 if βδ −





To sum up: in equilibrium consumption would be equal in all periods
and Self 1 would smoke if α > 1
δβ but not if α < 1
δβ .
3. Welfare Analysis: The Precommitment Criterion
Is the laissez faire outcome of smoking and no savings optimal? To
answer, we need to deﬁne “optimal”. An obvious welfare criterion is Pareto
optimality applied across selves. Let us say that a pattern of choices is
intraself pareto optimal if no change can be made which would make some self
better oﬀ without making some other self worse oﬀ according to the particular
selves’ utility functions. This has frequently been applied to multiple selves
models (e.g. in Bernheim & Rangel (2007)), since it seems unobjectionable
as a minimal condition for optimality.
We have seen, however, that the three selves have contradictory pref-
erences for smoking and consumption. When Selves 0 and 2 do not want
smoking but Self 1 does, what should the social planner do? The situation
is intraself Pareto optimal, but it would also be intraself Pareto optimal if
the regulator banned smoking. The criterion does not provide a reason to
choose one policy over the other.
A second welfare criterion is what I will call the “precommitment cri-
terion”: maximize Self 0’s utility by seeing what would happen if he could
6directly commit to a future course of action, rather than having to try to
manipulate his future selves.
The Precommitment Criterion: A change in the value of the choice
variables is an improvement if it increases the utility of Self 0.
The attraction of the precommitment criterion is that it is the same as
our standard approach under exponential utility, simply adding the recogni-
tion that the social planner will have to somehow constrain the future selves
so that they act in accord with Self 0’s wishes. The precommitment crite-
rion is commmonly used in the literature, almost always in connection with
decisions about consumption and savings (see, e.g. Laibson (1997), Harris &
Laibson (2001), and Krusell & Smith (2003) ).
Gruber & Koszegi (2001) use a model of a divided self to look at whether
smoking should be taxed– a model focussing not on consumption, but on
vice. In their model, a person lives for a ﬁnite number of periods and must
decide the amount of smoking and other consumption for each period. Smok-
ing is addictive, so smoking more now lowers future utility. Discounting is
quasi-hyperbolic rather than exponential, so decisions are time inconsistent;
in period 1 the person would deviate from the period 1 smoking level he
thought was best in period 0. They use the precommitment criterion, max-
imizing Self 0’s utility, and show that a large tax on cigarettes is optimal.
O’Donoghue & Rabin (2003) also looks at sin taxes with time-inconsistent
consumers to make the point that time-consistent consumers may be hurt
very little and time-inconsistent consumers helped a great deal by sin taxes.
Caplin & Leahy (2004) and Whitman (2006) criticize this focussing on the
welfare of the “long-run” or earliest self– the “dictatorship of the present”.
In eﬀect, focussing on the early self asks what would happen if a person could
commit himself to future actions (in this case, cigarette smoking), and how
government action could bring consumption closer to that outcome when
personal commitment is not possible.
Let us start then by following Gruber & Koszegi (2001) and privileging
the earliest self. The social planner’s role is then to act to allow the person
to commit to all his future actions and thereby avoid the consequences of
time inconsistency.3
3There are two variants of the precommitment criterion. In one, it is literally the earliest
7Using the precommitment criterion, the laissez faire outcome fails to
maximize welfare if α ∈ (1
δ, 1
βδ) because Self 0’s optimality condition (6) and
Self 1’s optimality condition (5) conﬂict. The optimality conditions diﬀer
whenever there is hyperbolic discounting and β < 1.
Self 1 trades oﬀ the present period 1 against the future period 2 at the
high rate of 1 to βδ, whereas Self 0 trades oﬀ the future period 1 against
the distant-future period 2 at the lower rate of δ. The problem is not that
sensations further in the future should not be treated as less important– a low
δ by itself would not introduce a reason for paternalism– but quasi-hyperbolic
discounting makes the present period count too heavily.
If discounting is exponential, i.e. if β = 1, then there is no time in-
consistency and the precommitment criterion will not call for a paternalistic
ban on smoking. Self 1 will make the correct smoking decision even without
coercion. It is still true that smoking hurts Self 2, possibly by much more
than it helps Self 1, but if the exponential discount factor δ is small enough
that Self 1 would choose smoking, then it is small enough that Self 0 cares
much more about period 1 smoking utility than period 2 smoking disutility.
The precommitment criterion can also be applied to consumption rates,
but it would suggest no change from laissez faire. The positive analysis above
showed that Self 0 wants zero savings and C0 = C1 = C2 = W anyway, which
precommitment is unnecessary to attain. Borrowing would be a diﬀerent
matter, but that is ruled out for the moment by assumption.
Thus, using the precommitment criterion, a paternalistic ban on smok-
ing might be desirable when discounting is hyperbolic to avoid the conse-
quences of the high value placed on present satisfaction. Self 0, like Self 1,
places high value on present satisfaction, but the smoking decision is in pe-
riod 1, so Self 0 wishes to override Self 1’s desires because of the harm they
self whose utility is maximized. In the other, the modeller creates a “long-run self” who
exists before Self 0 and who derives no utility from present sensations, only from future
sensations. The long-run self approach can be attractive in the context of quasi-hyperbolic
utility when the ﬁrst “real” self is making consumption decisions, because the long-run
self is eﬀectively a self with exponential utility (he might have a β term in his utility
function, but since he takes no immediate actions his present-orientedness is irrelevant).
In our present context, the diﬀerence between the two variants is unimportant, since the
smoking action occurs in Period 1, after Period 0.
8cause Self 2.
The objection to the precommitment criterion is its arbitrariness. Why
privilege Self 0 rather than some later self? Moreover, if followed literally
the criterion is ambiguous: one period later, Self 1 will have become “Self
0” and the social planner would have to undo the earlier decisions to follow
the desires of the new current self. Of course, the criterion is not meant to
be taken literally: what is special about Self 0 is that he is making a choice
about something before it becomes a present decision. The idea is that the
present-time orientation of a hyperbolically discounting person is illegitimate
and we are willing to override consumer sovereignty. One might as well say
that for the social planner, β = 1. That is not an unreasonable argument,
but it an uncomfortable one. We do not ordinarily argue that tastes are
illegitimate. Moreover, the criterion disregards not only the desire of Self 1,
the self making the choice about smoking, but also the desires of Self 2, the
post-action self.
4. The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion
As we have seen, a smoking ban can be optimal because of hyperbolic
discounting under the precommitment criterion in a multiple selves model
but once we have adopted the idea of multiple selves, defending that crite-
rion becomes a challenge. An alternative is to apply our standard welfare
criterion, but to within the self. We could apply the Kaldor-Hicks criterion:
requiring that a change would beneﬁt all selves if appropriate cash transfers
were made, but not requiring the transfers themselves. If we accept this logic
for policy consequences between diﬀerent individuals, it seems all the more
acceptable within one individual, since we are no longer trading oﬀ utilities
interpersonally.
The Intraself Kaldor-Hicks Criterion: A change in the value of the
choice variables is an improvement if it could be combined with money trans-
fers such that the combined changes would increase the utility of at least one
self and reduce the utility of none.
The intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion takes the laissez faire outcome as
the base and asks whether the winners from a change would be willing to
9compensate the losers.4 This captures the idea with which we started that a
vice causes more future disutility than it causes present utility.
Like the precommitment criterion, the intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion
does not suggest changing consumption from laissez faire in the present
model. Because the discount rate exceeds the interest rate, a later self could
not compensate an earlier self for saving more.
The smoking choice of X = 0 or X = 1 is diﬀerent. It adds (X −βδαX)
to Self 1’s utility and −αX to Self 2’s. Would Self 2 pay enough to change
Self 1’s laissez faire decision of X = 1? Selves 1 and 2 never meet, so the
transaction is not possible, but Kaldor-Hicks only requires a potential Pareto
improvement, not an actual one. There is a complication, however: Self 1
cares about Self 2’s consumption level, so a dollar payment from Self 2 to Self
1 raises Self 1’s utility by less than one dollar. Moreover, Self 0’s utility is also
aﬀected by any transaction between Self 1 and Self 2. Thus, when we start
to consider transfers, the question of whether a payment would compensate
is more complicated than it would be between strangers.
Since Selves 0 and 2 both might beneﬁt from the smoking ban, let us
imagine both of them making payments to Self 1 in exchange for the ban,
payments to Self 1 of P0 and P2 as measured in giving- period dollars. Since
our starting point is U(Ct) = W in each period, the diﬀerences between
the utilities when the smoking bargain is made (X = 0) and when it is not
(X = 1) are:
∆U0 =

[W − P0] + βδ
 




+ βδ2(W − P2)
	
−}W + βδ(W + 1) + βδ2(W − α)}
= −P0 + βδ
 




+ βδ2(−P2 + α)
(7)
∆U1 = {W + (1 + r)P0 +
P2
1+r + βδ(W − P2)} − {W + 1 + βδ(W − α)}
= (1 + r)P0 +
P2
1+r − 1 + βδ(−P2 + α)
(8)
4This is the version of Kaldor (1939); in the version of Hicks (1939) we ask whether the
losers would be unwilling to pay the winners to prevent the change; in Scitovsky (1941)
a change must pass both tests. The idea is even older. See Chipman & Moore (1978) for
discussion of its history, including, e.g., a discussion of Pareto’s and Pigou’s views.
10and
∆U2 = {W − P2} − {W − α}
= −P2 + α
(9)
We can ﬁnd the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a Pareto improve-
ment by picking P0 and P2 to make Selves 1 and 2 indiﬀerent about the
bargain and then seeing if Self 0’s utility rises under the resulting P0. Self
2 is indiﬀerent if P2 = α, from equation (9). Substituting into Self 1’s net
beneﬁt equation (8), Self 1’s net beneﬁt is zero if Self 0 pays him:
P0 =
1 + r − α
(1 + r)2 . (10)
Substituting the values of P2 = α and P0 = 1+r−α
(1+r)2 into Self 0’s net beneﬁt
equation, (7), tells us that Self 0 will derive higher utility from paying P0 to
ban smoking than from blocking the transaction if
α > 1 + r. (11)
Thus, if the diﬀerence between Self 2’s loss from smoking and Self 1’s
gain exceeds the interest rate, smoking should be banned.
Nothing in this argument has relied on hyperbolic discounting. We could
have assumed β = 1 and the conclusion would be the same. Thus we have
Result 1.
Result 1: The intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion can justify paternalistic ban-
ning of a vice even if discounting is exponential.
Why is hyperbolic discounting inessential? Unlike the precommitment
criterion, the intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not rely on conﬂicting time
preferences to justify helping a future self, but on low interest rates. The
argument for Result 1 relies not on the altruism of earlier selves to generate
utility, but on the willingness of the future self to sacriﬁce consumption.
To see this set β = 0, so earlier selves care nothing for later selves. The
precommitment criterion no longer has anything to say about a smoking
ban, since Self 0 cares nothing about either Self 1 or Self 2. The intraself
Kaldor-Hicks criterion, however, still bans smoking if α > 1 + r, which is to
11say if Self 2 loses more from Self 1’s smoking than can be compensated by
the rate of interest.
We can think of there being market failure within the self, a missing
market for trade of future money for present abstention. If the social planner
created that market, he would create gains from trade, and both buyer and
seller would beneﬁt when Self 1 sells a smoking ban to Self 2.
Contrast the conditions under which a smoking ban raises welfare under
our two welfare criteria.









Kaldor − Hicks : α > 1 + r. (13)
In both, greater smoking damage α makes a ban more attractive. Under
the precommitment criterion, the smoking damage has to be large relative
to the time preference discount factor, because under hyperbolic discounting
(β < 1). Self 1 attaches more weight to period 1 actions than Self 0 would
like. Under the intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the smoking damage has to
be large relative to the interest rate, because it then outweighs the fact that
Self 1 gets less consumption out of having a period 1 dollar than Self 2, able
to wait a period and earn interest on it, would get from that same dollar.
What if Only the Post-Action Self Pays Compensation?
We have just seen that if α > 1 + r then Self 2 would be willing to
compensate Self 1, with the aid of Self 0. What if Self 2 had to compensate
Self 1 by himself? If Self 0 chose P0 = 0, then Self 1’s net beneﬁt from




− 1 + βδ(−P2 + α) (14)
This solves to a necessary payment of
P
∗
2 = (1 − αβδ)(1 + r)

1
1 − βδ(1 + r)

. (15)
12The three terms of Self 2’s payment in (15) illustrates three eﬀects of a
transfer by Self 2 to Self 1 to stop smoking. First, Self 1 must be compensated
for the direct eﬀect of not smoking, a loss of 1 to himself that is partly
compensated for by the αβδ in utility to himself from Self 2’s beneﬁt. Second,
if P2 is measured in period 2 dollars, we must multiply it by (1+r) to get the
value in period 1 dollars. Third, Self 1 suﬀers disutility from the reduction
in Self 2’s utility that results from Self 2’s making the payment, and Self
2’s payment to him must be inﬂated by 1
1−βδ(1+r) to compensate for that.
Note that if Self 1 cares only about the present (βδ = 0) then the necessary
payment is simple: P2 = 1 + r. The complexity arises from Self 1’s concern
about period 2 consumption.
What condition on the harm from smoking α is necessary for Self 2 to
be willing to pay the entire compensation to Self 1? Self 2 is willing to pay so
long as P2 ≥ α. Setting P2 = α in equation (15) and solving for α, however,
yields
α = 1 + r,
which is the same as the critical value for banning smoking when Self 0 also
paid compensation.
Why is it that Self 0’s beneﬁt from banning smoking has no eﬀect on
when smoking should be banned? One would think that if α is slightly too
small for Self 2 to be willing to pay enough to Self 1 to stop smoking then
Self 0’s additional contribution would tip the balance. Remember, though,
that Self 0 only beneﬁts from a smoking ban if α > 1
βδ. Thus, the interval
of α for which banning smoking would be optimal but Self 2 is unwilling
to pay the entire compensation is [ 1
βδ,1 + r]. This, however, is an empty
interval, because by the consume-early assumption, 1
βδ > 1 + r. Whenever
Self 2 is unwilling to pay enough to Self 1 for him to stop smoking, Self 0 is
unwilling to pay him anything at all, so Self 0’s willingness to pay ends up
being irrelevant. That irrelevance is why the hyperbolicity parameter β fails
to show up in the optimality condition for regulation.
On the other hand, shouldn’t Self 0’s beneﬁt from smoking aﬀects the
optimality condition for smoking? Couldn’t it happen that a bargain helps
Selves 1 and 2, but to the detriment of Self 0, who does want Self 1 to smoke
if α < 1
δ? This cannot happen, because Self 0 also beneﬁts from Self 2’s
payment to Self 1. If Self 2’s payment of P2 to Self 1 makes Self 1 indiﬀerent
13about whether to smoke or not, then Self 0 is no worse oﬀ either, since he
gains as much from Self 1’s added consumption as from Self 1’s reduced
smoking, plus Self 0 gets more beneﬁt from Self 2’s reduced smoking damage
than loss from Self 2’s reduced consumption.
Self 0’s willingness to pay to stop Self 1 smoking does become relevant
in one circumstance, however: if incomes are low relative to the utility from
smoking. I have skirted one requirement for the Kaldor-Hicks payment that
drives Result 1: Self 2 must be able to aﬀord to pay it. If P ∗
2 > W, then Self
2 is too poor to pay enough to Self 1 to induce him to stop smoking. Selves
1 and 2 together, however, might still have enough income and willingness
to do so. Self 0’s
What is eﬃcient under the intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion does depend
on the distribution of wealth– that initial allocation of decision rights de-
scribed above. In the transaction just described, Self 2 pays
(1+r)(1−αβδ)
1−βδ(1+r) to
Self 1. If it is Self 2 alone who pays Self 1, this requires that Self 2’s income
be large enough: W ≥
(1+r)(1−αβδ)
1−βδ(1+r) . Otherwise, Self 2 could not pay Self 1
enough to compensate for Self 1’s loss of utility from smoking. If it is both
Selves 0 and 2 who pay Self 1, then if Self 2 reaches his budget constraint
Self 0 must be able to pay the remainder. The amount Self 0 is willing to
pay when Self 2 pays W can be found by substituting P2 = W in Self 0’s net
beneﬁt equation, (7) and solving for P0, which yields:
P0 =
βδ( W
1+r − 1 + δα − δW)
1 − βδ(1 + r)
. (16)
The main point of equation (16) is that Self 0 is willing to pay some-
thing to make the nonsmoking agreement go through if Self 2’s income is
insuﬃcient. The very complexity of the equation, however, and the fact that
it remains positive even if β = 1 and there is no hyperbolic discounting,
illustrates a second point: Self 0’s gain from Self 2’s payment to Self 1 is not
entirely due to its eﬀect on smoking. There is a second beneﬁt to Self 0: that
consumption is transferred from Self 2 to Self 1. Given the consume-early
assumption of heavy discounting, Self 0 prefers consumption to be moved
up in time. We have constrained the moving up of consumption by assum-
ing that borrowing is impossible, but the Kaldor-Hicks payments have the
same eﬀect. This will become clearer in the next section when we do allow
borrowing.
145. Borrowing and Saving in the Linear-Utility Model
Should the Social Planner Permit Borrowing?
I have assumed borrowing was impossible. What if the social planner
could replicate borrowing across selves by a system of age-dependent taxes
and transfers? Under laissez faire, each self consumed his entire endowment
rather than save. Would they now borrow?
The precommitment criterion says that the social planner should permit
borrowing, which would transfer all consumption to period 0. Self 0 would
choose to consume all three selves’ endowments because of the assumption
that the rate of time preference is high and the utility function is linear in
consumption.
The intraself Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks criteria lead to a diﬀerent result:
they would not instruct the government to replicate borrowing. Permitting
borrowing would help Self 0, but hurt Selves 1 and 2. By assigning all wealth
to Self 0, it would prevent any exchange of goods for money on which to base
a potential Pareto improvement.
The multiple selves paradigm is a bigger change from standard norma-
tive economics than it might ﬁrst seem. The paradigm provides a plausible
reason for banning smoking, but it weakens the argument against usury laws.
The argument for banning smoking is that the ban hurts the present self less
than it helps the future self. If the two could bargain across time, they would
do so and both would be better oﬀ. The conventional argument against usury
laws is that if someone accepts a loan, he must think that the beneﬁt in cur-
rent consumption is worth the loss in future consumption. That is just to
say that Self 0 beneﬁts from borrowing, however, despite the loss to Selves 1
and 2. A usury law banning borrowing would hurt Self 0 but beneﬁt Selves
1 and 2, so under the intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion, we cannot say that
the change is either a gain or a loss. We would have to resort to some other
argument to justify the allocation of property rights among the three selves.5
5Richard Posner (1985, p. 93) says “If you asked a random group of economists how
to assign property rights in a new society with a literate population so as to maximize the
prices (time quantities), explicit and implicit (“shadow”), asking and oﬀer, in the society
they would almost certainly begin by giving each mentally competent adult the property
rights to his own labor.” In the intraself context, that would imply a ban on borrowing,
15The Eﬀect of Borrowing on the Optimality of Smoking
I just discussed the implications of borrowing for consumption, but bor-
rowing has implications for the optimality of smoking too. If borrowing is
possible, that aﬀects whether a Kaldor-Hicks improvement can be made. The
possibility of borrowing has an income eﬀect. It alters the wealth controlled
by each self and thus aﬀects their willingnesses to pay for smoking changes.
Let us start from a position in which borrowing is possible without
intervention by the social planner: Selves 0 and 1 may borrow against future
income for present consumption. We will assume they borrow at the same
rate r at which they can lend.
The laissez faire result is that Self 0 would borrow and consume the
entire endowment. Selves 1 and 2 would consume zero, and Self 1 would
smoke. The extreme consumption result occurs because of the assumptions
of linear utility and the rate of time preference being higher than the interest
rate.
Under the precommitment criterion, the laissez faire outcome of zero
consumption for Selves 1 and 2 is optimal, but not the outcome of Self 1
smoking (except in the extreme case of β = 0, at which Self 0 is indiﬀerent
about Self 1 smoking). If β is positive Self 0 would still borrow and consume
all of the endowments, but would use the same critical value of α > 1/δ as
before to ban smoking.
The intraself Pareto improvement and Kaldor-Hicks criteria, agree with
the precommitment criterion in not requiring any change from zero consump-
tion by Selves 1 and 2. Any such change would harm Self 0, and the harm to
Self 0 would be exactly balanced by beneﬁt to the other two selves, a matter
of redistribution rather than any improvement in social surplus.
What is more surprising is that unlike when borrowing was impossible,
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion now does not require a ban on smoking whenever
the present value of utility harm exceeds the utility beneﬁt (α > 1 + r).
There is no scope for mutually beneﬁcial trade of wealth for wealth, of
course, but the possibility of borrowing has also eliminated the possibility of
so that each self would be able to keep (or pass along) the fruits of his own period’s labor.
16mutually beneﬁcial trade of wealth for a smoking ban. As a result of Self 0’s
borrowing, Selves 1 and 2 have zero wealth. Self 2 cannot oﬀer any wealth
to Self 1 in exchange for the smoking ban.
Self 0 could oﬀer some wealth to Self 1 in exchange for a smoking ban.
Would he oﬀer enough?
The eﬀect on Self 0’s utility of a bargain in which he gives P to Self 1
in exchange for a smoking ban is
−P + βδ(−1 + P) + βδ
2α (17)
The minimum P that Self 1 would accept is P =
1−βδα
1+r . Substituting
that P into the expression for Self 0’s utility change and solving for α yields
the condition for Self 0’s utility to rise from the bargain:
α >
1 + δβr
βδ(1 − βδ + δ(1 + r))
(18)
Condition (18) is stronger than the precommitment criterion’s condition
of the smoking damage being α > 1/δ, but weaker than Self 1’s condition
for not smoking, α > 1
βδ. If β = 1, it is equivalent to α > 1
δ, and regulation
is unnecessary because Self 1 will abstain from smoking whenever Self 0
would be willing to pay him not to smoke.6 If, however, discounting is quasi-
hyperbolic so β < 1, a smoking ban raises welfare under the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion whenever the smoking damage is greater than 1/δ but less than the
α in inequality (18).
Result 2: If the person borrows enough against his future income, the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion can support a smoking ban only if discounting is hyperbolic.
Allowing borrowing has changed the distribution of wealth. Before,
Selves 0, 1, and 2 each controlled W under laissez faire (as well as Self 1
controlling the value of X, a property right which is part of his economic
wealth). Now, Self 0 controls all three incomes by being able to borrow. Self
6 The right-hand- side is less than 1/βδ because (1 + δβr)βδ < βδ(1 − βδ + δ(1 + r))
because βδ < βδ(1 − βδ + δ and (δβr)βδ < δβr. The right-hand-side is at least as great
as 1/δ because (1 + δβr) ≥ β(1 − βδ + δ(1 + r)) because 1 ≥ β(1 − βδ + δ) because that
reaches a maximum at β = 1, when β(1 − βδ + δ) = 1.
171 only controls the value of X and what income Self 0 lets him control. Self
2 only controls what income Self 1 lets him control. Thus, Self 2 is too poor
to participate in any Coasean bargain, though Self 0 can still do so. Since
Self 0 can still participate, however, if discounting is quasi-hyperbolic then
Self 0 is willing to pay enough to Self 1 to make him agree not to smoke.
The only problem is enforcing such a bargain, and that is where government
regulation can be helpful.
This is the driving force behind the smoking license idea of Bhattacharya
& Ladkdawalla (2004). In a model with time inconsistency induced by quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, they suggest the use of voluntary smoking licenses
that a person could purchase to constrain his future smoking. These licenses
would subject the future self to high cigarette taxes, but would also entitle
the future self to a lump-sum transfer that would make him better oﬀ overall.
Thus, all selves can be made better oﬀ, a Pareto improvement. In the context
of the present paper’s model, such a scheme would allow Self 0 to buy a ban
on his future Self 1’s smoking. Self 1 would receive the purchase price, which
would be set high enough to increase his utility. Of course, under the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion Self 0’s willingness to pay that much would be suﬃcient for
a ban to be welfare-improving.
Finally, it is worth noting that although the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does
not require a smoking ban when discounting is exponential, borrowing is
unlimited, and smoking damage is large, it does not argue against one either.
Suppose we think of a smoking ban as the allocation of the property right of
the smoking decision to Self 2 instead of Self 1. The re-allocation is purely
hypothetical since Self 2 does not exist at the time of the decision, but it
illustrates how the initial allocation aﬀects the optimal outcome. Smoking
would not occur under laissez faire because it would not maximize Self 2’s
utility. The intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion would be satisﬁed, because Self
1 would have no money with which to buy X = 1 from Self 2. In fact, if
α < 1 + r Self 1 would not wish to buy it even if he did have the funds,
because the value of smoking to him is less than its cost to Self 2. Similarly,
if Self 0 started by controlling the decision (as he would, in eﬀect, under
the precommitment criterion), Self 1 would be unable to buy the right to
smoke from Self 0, and Kaldor-Hicks would accept a smoking ban as optimal–
though in that case, if Self 1 had the funds, he would be willing to buy the
right from Self 0 and Self 0 would be willing to sell. The Kaldor-Hicks
18criterion’s recommendations depends on the initial allocation of property
rights.
What if the Interest Rate is High and Income Is Saved?






In equilibrium Selves 0 and 1 would save their entire income under laissez
faire, a result that neither the precommitment criterion nor Kaldor-Hicks
would change.
Self 1 would, however, still smoke, because the eﬀect of smoking on Self
2’s utility is unaﬀected by the rate of interest. And the precommitment
criterion would still ban smoking.
Foreshadowing Result 3 below, however, Kaldor-Hicks would no longer
support a smoking ban except under hyperbolic discounting. In our hypo-
thetical transaction, Selves 1 and 2 transfer consumption to Self 1, but now
Self 1 would ﬁnd this undesirable, a penalty rather than a reward. Under the
consume-late assumption, Self 1 gains utility of 1 from his own consumption
of 1 unit of income, but utility of 1+r
δβ > 1 from Self 2’s consumption. Self 0
would be passing along his entire endowment to Self 1 anyway, and so could
not credibly condition the payment on Self 1 not smoking. Hence, potential
gains from trade are absent.
6. A Model with Concave Utility and Money Transfers across Time
Our method has been to ask whether the losers from smoking would
be willing to compensate the winner for stopping. We have seen that (1)
internalities can justify a smoking ban when borrowing is constrained, (2) if
borrowing is unconstrained, the argument fails because the future self is too
poor to pay compensation, and that (3) if the interest rate is so high that all
income is saved, the arguments fails because the present self would not want
to accept the payment and reduce the future self’s consumption. Those cross-
time consumption decisions were corner solutions because of the assumption
19of linear utility. What if we introduce a motive for partial, interior-solution
“bequests” from one self to a later self?
One might guess from Barro (1974) and Becker (1974) that bequests
would have an important eﬀect. Barro (1974) applies the idea of “Ricardian
equivalence” to intergenerational debt. If the government taxes a future
generation to pay a pension to the present generation, the direct eﬀect is
to make the present generation consume more and the future generation
less. If the present generation cared enough to leave a bequest to the future
generation, however, then when the pension is introduced the bequest will
simply be increased to take account of the increase in future taxes. Becker
(1974) introduces the “Rotten Kid Theorem” that even an non- altruistic
member of a family will act to increase family income if the family’s altruistic
head gives transfers to every member of the family.
Barro’s model is simply about transfers of wealth, on which the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion is silent, but he makes the point that bequests can undo
the eﬀect of government intervention. Becker (1974, p. 1078) goes further.
Besides the Rotten Kid Theorem (that each family member will maximize
family income if some altruistic member makes transfers to everyone), the
paper includes what we might call the Nightlight Problem. Imagine an al-
truistic husband who must decide whether to read in bed at night, when he
knows that his wife would pay ten dollars if he did not and he would pay no
more than six dollars for the right to read. Being altruistic, he cares about
his wife’s utility enough to be making monetary transfers to her. Given that
he is going to reduce his own utility to increase his wife’s, he wants to do
it as eﬃciently as possible. He will refrain from reading at night, because if
he doesn’t mind inﬂicting ten dollars of harm on his wife, he can do it by
giving her ten dollars less to spend.7 The Nightlight Problem has the same
ﬂavor as our smoking example. Will interior solutions for altruistic transfers
eliminate ineﬃcient behavior8
7Becker also looks at the nightlight problem from the point of view of the wife, in a
closer analogy to the Rotten Kid Theorem’s result that even a selﬁsh child will act to
increase family income. If the wife controls the nightlight decision, she will allow the
husband to read at night if that is eﬃcient, because he will compensate her for her lower
utility with a bigger cash transfer.
8 Bergstrom (1989) has shown that the eﬃciency conclusion and other extensions of
the Rotten Kid Theorem to more than one consumption good require caveats. If the wife
chooses the amount of nightlight in Bergstrom’s example, she will choose an ineﬃciently
20To see what happens when consumption decisions are interior solutions,
let us now make the utility of consumption strictly concave, a function U(C)
with U0 > 0, U00 < 0, and
limit
C → 0 U0(C) = ∞. Let us assume that borrowing
is limited to an amount B in borrowing period dollars, where we will not
assume that this constraint is binding. Let us also abandon the consumer-
early assumption: do not assume that the the interest rate r and the discount
factors β and δ have any restricted relation to each other.
Let us imagine a Kaldor-Hicks transfer of P from Self 2 to Self 1 to ban
smoking, with P measured in period 2 dollars. This payment will cost Self 2
amount P and increase Self 1’s consumption by P/(1 + r). In addition, Self
1 may be borrowing amount B ≤ B, which will cost Self 2 amount (1 + r)B
in consumption.
Let W1 equal Self 1’s income of W plus whatever Self 0 saves, minus
whatever Self 1 borrows from him. Self 1 is constrained to spend no more
than his income on present consumption, so




If this is binding, then Self 1 is borrowing the full amount B from Self 2. If
it is not binding, then Self 1 is saving or is borrowing less than B.
Self 2’s consumption will be equal to his income of W plus (1+r) times
the amount Self 1 saves, (W1 − C1), this last being negative if Self 1 is
borrowing instead of saving:
C2 = W + (1 + r)(W1 − C1) (21)
Self 1’s maximization problem is to choose X, C1, and C2 to maximize
U1(C1,C2,X) = X + U(C1) + βδ(−αX + U(C2)) (22)
subject to the constraints
(a) C1 ≤ W1 + B +
(1−X)P
1+r
(b) C2 = W + (1 + r)(W1 − C1)
(23)
small amount of light because she knows the husband’s choice of monetary transfer will
depend on her choice and she acts strategically. In the present paper, Self 2 does not
control the amount of smoking, so no such strategic eﬀect will be present.
21Constraint (a) is either binding or not binding. Consider ﬁrst the case
where it is not binding. Instead, Self 1 ﬁnds it optimal to save, or to borrow
less than B. Then we can substitute for C2 from constraint (b) and write
the problem as to maximize by choice of C1 and X
X + U(C1) + βδ(−αX + U(W + (1 + r)(W1 − C1)). (24)
The problem needs no budget constraint, because by deﬁnition of the case,
income does not constrain the choice of C1. Rather, the desire to save con-
strains it.
In this problem, the condition for choosing X = 1 is that
1 − βδα > 0, (25)
and the ﬁrst order condition with respect to C1 is
U0(C1) + βδ(1 + r)U0(W + (1 + r)(W1 − C1) = 0 (26)
The price P appears in neither of these two optimality conditions. Hence,
Self 2’s oﬀer of P in exchange for the smoking ban makes no diﬀerence. Either
Self 1 would abstain from smoking anyway, or he would not be persuaded
by the oﬀer of money from Self 2. If discounting is exponential, then it is
only Self 2 who would be willing to oﬀer money to Self 1 in exchange for not
smoking, because Self 0 shares Self 1’s incentives, as we saw earlier. Thus,
Kaldor-Hicks no longer can support a smoking ban, as Result 3 states.
Result 3: If discounting is exponential and a person’s borrowing constraint is
non-binding (including if he is saving a positive amount), then the intraself
Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not support a smoking ban.
If Self 1 cares enough about Self 2 to pass savings along to him, then the
intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not require Self 1 to give up smoking for
the sake of Self 2. If Self 1 is selﬁsh enough not to save, the criterion does
require him to give up smoking. Thus, as in the Nightlight Problem, there is
no Kaldor-Hicks ineﬃciency, but it is not because the altruist abstains from
seemingly ineﬃcient behavior, but because he will not accept compensation
for abstaining.
The intuition behind Result 3 is that when Self 1 is saving, the marginal
dollar of saving results in period 2 consumption that gives him as much utility
22(discounted though it is) as if he spent that dollar on period 1 consumption.
He would be hurt by anything that transferred that consumption back to
period 1. Thus, if he consumes the Kaldor-Hicks payment given him by Self
2, he is actually worse oﬀ.
Similarly, if Self 1 is borrowing less than the limit, he has decided that
though overall he would like to reduce Self 2’s consumption to increase his
own, at the margin, once he has borrowed the appropriate amount, his util-
ity is the same from having Self 2 consume a little as from having himself
consume more.
A Binding Borrowing Constraint
Consider now the case in which constraint (a) in maximization problem
(22) is binding, so Self 1 borrows the full amount B. In that case, we can
represent period-2 consumption by
C2 = W − (1 − X)P − (1 + r)B, (27)
which is period 2 income minus the no-smoking payment minus the repay-
ment of Self 1’s borrowing. Self 1’s problem is to maximize, by choice of X,
X + U(C1) + βδ(−αX + U(W − (1 − X)P − (1 + r)B) (28)
Self 1 will choose to smoke (X = 1) if
1+U(W1+B)+βδ(−α+U(W−(1+r)B) > U







When utility was linear, the marginal utility of income was 1 and the
payment P had to equal
(1+r)(1−αβδ)
1−βδ(1+r) , in equation (15). Now that the marginal
utility of income is not constant, the necessary payment P must reﬂect the
fact that for both Self 1 and Self 2 the marginal utility of income is changing
with income. Depending on the shape of the function U(C), there might
or might not be a Kaldor-Hicks transfer that would induce Self 1 to stop
smoking. The general case is unenlightening, but consider what happens if
our person care only about the present, so δ = 0. The payment by Self 2
23necessary to induce Self 1 to stop smoking is then, from inequality (30), such
that
1 + U(W1 + B) = U






Self 2 will be willing to pay that amount if income is high high enough
(P ∗ ≤ W − (1 + r)B) and
U(W − (1 + r)B − P
∗) ≥ −α + U(W − (1 + r)B). (31)
If U00 is close to zero, so utility is almost linear, and if r is low then the
gain in Self 1’s consumption utility from the transfer of P ∗ will be close to
the loss in Self 0’s, and if α is large enough, Self 2 would indeed be willing to
pay P ∗. If, on the other hand, the utility of cosumption ﬂattens beyond Self
1’s initial consumption level of W1 +B but increases enough for lower levels
of consumption, then Self 1 will be unwilling to deprive Self 2 of consumption
via the transfer of P ∗. Thus, there is a possibility of regulation being optimal
for borrowing-constrained individuals, but not a necessity.
This may be easier to see in a numerical example. Assume that W = 1,
K = 6, r = 0, B = .2, and that the utility function has marginal utilities of
U0(C) = 2 if C < 2
= 1 if C > 2. (32)
This person has some incentive to arrange the consumption path so that
consumption equals at least 2 in each period. We will retain the assumption
that smoking yields 1 in utility to Self 1 and costs α ∈ (1, 1
βδ) in utility to
Self 2.
(1) Suppose βδ < .5, in which case high time preference overrides the incen-
tive to smooth consumption. There is no saving, and Self 2 will pay Self 1
not to smoke. The laissez faire outcome will be C0 = 7.2,C1 = 1,X = 1, and
C2 = .8. If Self 0 or 1 deviates by saving more, he will lose utility at a rate
of 1 per reduced consumption unit and gain it at only a rate of 2βδ from his
successor’s increased consumption. Thus, Self 0 will borrow up to the limit
of B = .2 from Self 1, and Self 1 will borrow up to the limit from Self 2. Self
1 will smoke because smoking raises his utility by 1 directly and reduces it
only by βδα through its eﬀect on Self 2.
24The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion can support a smoking ban if βδ < .5 even
if β = 1 because Self 1 would accept as little as (.5 − βδα to stop smoking
(.5 rather than 1 because his marginal utility of consumption is 2, whereas
smoking only increases utility by 1) and Self 2 would be willing to pay up
to α/2, an amount greater than .5 since α > 1. We do not need to resort to
payments from Self 0.
We have seen in Result 2 that hyperbolic discounting can provide a rea-
son for regulation under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion even when the individual
is borrowing his entire future income. That continues to be true when he is
only borrowing part of it, as we will see by altering the discounting in our
numerical example.
(2) Suppose instead that .5 < βδ < 1, in which case consumption smoothing
outweighs discounting to some extent. The laissez faire outcome will be
C0 = 5,C1 = 2,X = 1, and C2 = 2. If Self 0 or 1 deviates by saving more,
he will lose utility at a rate of 1 per increased consumption unit and gain
it at the lower rate of βδ from his successor’s increased consumption. If
he deviates by saving less, he will gain utility at a rate of 1 per increased
consumption unit and lose it at the higher rate of 2βδ from his successor’s
reduced consumption.
Under laissez faire, Self 1 will smoke because it adds (1 − βδα) to his
utility.
There is no payment by Self 2 that will persuade Self 1 to stop smoking.
A payment of P by Self 2 will have a net eﬀect of (P − 2βδP) < 0 on Self
1’s utility, so Self 1 would refuse the payment even if it were not contingent
on not smoking.
Self 0, on the other hand, could pay P to Self 1 in addition to the laissez
faire bequest of 3 and Self 1 would have no objection. The eﬀect on Self 0’s
utility would be to add
−P + βδ(−1 + P) + βδ
2(α). (33)
Self 1 would accept a payment of as little as P = (1−βδα) to not smoke.
Substituting that for P in expression (33) tells us that Self 0’s utility would
25rise after making that payment to stop smoking if
α >
1
δβ(1 − βδ + δ)
, (34)
an expression similar to what we found in conjunction with Result 2 that even
with borrowing hyperbolic discounting could justify a smoking ban under the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion.
We have assumed that α < 1
δβ, but since (1 − βδ − δ) > 1, the critical
value of α for Self 0 to be willing to pay to stop smoking is feasible. There is a
range of values of α– though narrow one– for which Self 1 would not abstain
from smoking unilaterally but would after a payment that Self 0 would be
willing to pay. This does rely on hyperbolic discounting, since if β = 1 our
condition for Self 0 being will to make the payment reduces to α > 1, the
same condition as for Self 1 to unilaterally abstain from smoking when β = 1.
Thus we have Result 4.
Result 4: The intraself Kaldor- Hicks criterion can support a smoking ban
for someone whose borrowing constraint is binding or who uses hyperbolic
discounting.
9. Concluding Remarks
This this paper I have asked whether applying a version of the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion to a multiple selves model provides a justiﬁcation for inter-
vention by a benevolent social planner. It does provide a justiﬁcation, with
caveats. A ﬁrst requirement is that the activity cause more immediate harm
than it creates future beneﬁt. If so, this has a ripple eﬀect under dynamic
inconsistency because not only does the far future self suﬀer more than the
near future self beneﬁts, but the present self suﬀers sympathetically with the
far future self. A second requirement is that the extent of the harm outweigh
the real cost of transferring consumption to earlier in time, which is the in-
terest rate. A third requirement is that if discounting is exponential the the
person not be saving between the time he engages in the harmful activity
and the time the harm occurs, or not be borrowing the maximum possi-
ble. Otherwise, the earlier self would not value transfers to himself from the
future self, and there are no potential gains from trade. Even if the person
engaged in the harmful behavior is making a bequest, however, if discounting
26is hyperbolic the Kaldor-Hicks criterion can justify restricting his behavior
for the sake of selves prior to himself in time who care more than he does for
consequences in the far future.
Thus, we may conclude that hyperbolic discounting and the precom-
mitment condition of maximizing the utility function of the pre- action self
are not essential for paternalistic arguments for regulating internalities. For
someone who is impatient and constrained in his borrowing, the intraself
Kaldor-Hicks criterion can justify regulation even if the person’s discounting
is exponential. Regulators often are most concerned to regulate the young
and poor because they may have poorer information and self-control. The
present model suggests a quite diﬀerent reason: that they are credit con-
strained and would be willing to accept payment from their future selves to
abstain from vice.
Even if the person is saving, the intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion can
justify regulation if discounting is hyperbolic, but for a narrower range of pa-
rameters and for a diﬀerent reason. The two reasons for regulation have dif-
ferent motives. When discounting is exponential, regulation is balancing the
vice’s harm to the future self against his willingness to give up consumption.
If discounting is hyperbolic, regulation is adjusting for the pre-vice self’s lack
of present-orientedness in balancing the interests of the future selves. Even
under hyperbolic discounting, however, the intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion
justiﬁes regulation more narrowly than the precommitment criterion does,
because Kaldor-Hicks requires potential compensation to the regulated self.
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